New Apologetics Patrick Speckamp
You wrote:
Surely, if God is omnipotent and has provided humans with free will out of generosity, then he would still have the power to change absolutely any human will.
We reply:
It is logically impossible for God to force someone to freely do something. Of course, we grant that God could (when we look at the question strictly in terms of power, and disregard divine goodness) revoke free will and force any person to act in one way or another.
You wrote:
I absolutely agree on your statement that giving away power yet still keeping the same power is logically impossible.
We reply:
Very well. This is enough to solve the paradox. See the point concerning P2 above.
You wrote:
You write that God “chose” to give away the power of free will. To me this would seem like God deliberately chose to diminish his omnipotence in favour of his creation to decide for themselves.
We reply:
We assert that he did do this. If God has done so, it does not metaphysically alter the fact that the divine nature is omnipotent. Rather, the choice to give away power concerns only what God freely does with omnipotence. These are obviously two very distinct ideas.
You wrote:
I do not agree with the sweeping statement that the “state of the universe” is dependent on our decisions, it is provably not. Our tiny earth may be affected by some decisions we make but the universe as a whole could not care less.
We reply:
We would argue (from a scientific perspective alone) that there is not one thing in the universe that is not affected in some way by your decisions. The butterfly effect and universal gravitation are enough to establish this. Quantum entanglements add a whole other level to it…
You wrote:
God does know our decisions and nothing happens that would not have been a part of his plan from time immemorial. Is that correct?
We reply:
Trick question… We would say that there are great many things contrary to the intentions of God because real causal power was delegated to created persons, and (to a very large extent) that power was misused. We would also say that from all eternity, those events contrary to God’s intentions were “redeemed”. That is, they were integrated into a higher plan such that they do not contravene the divine order, even though when considered absolutely, in and of themselves, they are evil actions. This is a whole other conversation, though.
You wrote:
If so, our decisions would have been known from eternity. Our fate would have been known from eternity.
We reply:
We agree that our decisions are known from eternity.
You wrote:
The fact whether I’ll personally go to hell or not is not obscure to God, he already knows it, correct? And he has known it forever, is that correct?
We reply:
Yes.
You wrote:
If so, of what use is my free will?
We reply:
It is because the knowledge in question is not “foreknowledge” in the temporal sense, but is a function of all moments in time being immediately present to God. He knows what you will decide only *because* you freely decide it.
You wrote:
Either my fate has been known or it has not. And if it is not known then I have the option to change and shape it. If it is known, then free will would be an illusion.
We reply:
You have the freedom to determine it, and what you will do has been seen already.
You wrote:
You say that God can give away free will to his creatures. What I would grant you is that God can give away the*illusion* of free will, according to the characteristics that you ascribe to God. If everything is known from eternity, then there is no option to it. God can’t change what he already knows to be true. Time and space don’t even seem to have an effect on this, it’s just pure eternal knowledge.
We reply:
It would be pure eternal knowledge which is determined by the actions of free creatures.
You wrote:
Let me conclude with a question, to which I’d ask you to answer succinctly:
Does God know whether I’m going to heaven or hell?
We reply:
Yes, but it’s up to you where you go.
You wrote:
Lastly, from your answers and from what I understood and replied, Omnipotence and Omniscience are not friends, still.
We reply:
It seems that your position reduces to presupposing an A-theory of time such as to render God’s knowledge of free future actions impossible. Viz., if God knows them, then they must not be free. This, however, is not the case on a B-theory of time in which past, present, and future are equally real.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-theory_of_time
Ultimately, your paradox is not between omnipotence and omniscience, but between omniscience and free will on the presumption of an A-theory of time.
March 25, 2013 at 10:09pm · Like